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Abstract   This paper provides an analysis of technical and economic interrela-
tionships among species harvested in Hawaii’s pelagic longline fishery. The
results indicate that this multispecies fishery is characterized by a joint produc-
tion process, meaning that the regulation of one species would affect the harvest
of other species. It implies that a single species regulation may not be appropri-
ate in managing the longline fishery. Estimates of own-price output supply
elasticities suggest that fisher’s decisions on the amounts of each species har-
vested are independent of own expected prices. However, as evidenced by the
estimates of cross-price elasticities, there are a number of significant technical-
economic interactions among species. Failing to reject the null hypothesis of
input-output separability suggests that management of the entire fishery as a
whole by partial area/seasonal closure or by a ‘limited entry’ system as in the
past is justified instead of regulating a few key species.
Key words   Multispecies, pelagic longline fishery, dual revenue function, joint
production, input-output separability.
JEL Classification Codes   Q21, Q22.
Introduction
Management and regulation of multi-species marine fisheries is frequently compli-
cated by unknown technical and economic interrelationships among different
species (outputs). For example, a quota or output restriction on one species may re-
sult in increased exploitation of other species (Kirkley and Strand 1988). There has
been a growing consensus that fishery policies based on the bioeconomic model of a
single species are not appropriate for managing multispecies fisheries. Several stud-
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ies (Kirkley and Strand 1988; Squires and Kirkley 1991; Thunberg, Bresnyan, and
Adams 1995; Diop and Kazmierczak 1996) have indicated that failure to recognize
the technical and economic interrelationships among different species may lead to
unintended, negative outcomes for multispecies fisheries management. Therefore, it
is imperative to understand the underlying technical and economic interrelationships
among different species to devise appropriate policies for fishery management. In-
formation about species interaction is critical to Hawaii’s pelagic fisheries in the
context of a recent harvest ban of swordfish, Xiphias gladius, a major species tar-
geted by longliners.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the technical and economic inter-
relationships among species harvested by Hawaii’s longline fishery during 1991–98
using a multiproduct dual revenue function approach. It involves estimating supply,
effort and stock elasticities, and testing for hypotheses of nonjointness-in-inputs and
input-output separability. Information presented here can be useful in devising ap-
propriate fishery management policies and analyzing their technical and economic
impacts.
Longline Fishery in Hawaii
Pelagic species dominate Hawaii’s commercial and recreational fisheries, although
bottomfish and lobster are also important. Landings of important pelagic species by
Hawaii’s fisheries include four tuna species (bigeye tuna, Thunnus obesus; yellow-
fin, T. albacares; albacore, T. alalunga; and skipjack/aku), three billfish species
(swordfish; striped marlin, Tetrapterus audax; and blue marlin, Makaira mazara)
and several miscellaneous pelagic species (mahimahi, Coryphaena hippurus; wa-
hoo/ono, Acanthocybium solandri; aku, Katsuwonus pelamis; and moonfish/opah,
Lampris guttatus). These species are targeted by commercial, recreational, and part-
time commercial (expense boat) vessels (Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis 1996;
Hamilton and Huffman 1997).
Hawaii’s commercial pelagic catch totaled about 36 million pounds with ex-ves-
sel revenue of $59 million in 1999 (WPRFMC 2001). The longline fishery
represented about 90% of total commercial catch and value for the state. The re-
mainder came from bottomfish and other fisheries. In comparison, the commercial
catch was 9 to11 million pounds annually for the early- and mid-1980s. In 1999,
tuna species accounted for 45% of total commercial pelagic catch and 60% of total
revenue, while billfish and miscellaneous pelagic species accounted for the rest. In
terms of total landings by fleet, 28 million pounds (79%) of the total commercial pe-
lagic catch was caught by longliners, 3 million pounds (8.3%) by trollers, 2.3
million pounds (6.4%) by handliners, and the remainder came from aku and other
gears. Landings of each fleet feature multiple species.
Bigeye tuna has been a major target species since the 1950s. Swordfish was a
minor species until the 1990s when it became the major target species with the entry
of modern longline vessels targeting swordfish (Curran, Boggs, and He 1996; Dollar
1992). Swordfish and bigeye tuna account for most of the longline catch. However,
longliners also capture a significant amount of other pelagic species, such as yellow-
fin tuna, albacore tuna, striped marlin, blue marlin, and some sharks. In 1999, the
longline fleet accounted for 99% of Hawaii’s total commercial swordfish catch, 97%
of bigeye tuna, 89% of striped marlin, 79% of albacore tuna, 56% of blue marlin,
and 100% of sharks (WPRFMC 2001).
Hawaii’s longline fleet includes several older wooden longliners, a few wood
and fiberglass vessels, and many newer steel longliners that were previously en-Analyzing Technical and Economic Interrelationships 169
gaged in the fishery off the US mainland. The older vessels measure 43–70 feet in
length and are capable of taking two-week trips, while the more modern vessels
measure 70–100 feet and can travel for 2–3 months. The newer vessels are often
outfitted with water and ice-making machines and modern electronic equipment for
navigation, communications, and locating fish (WPRFMC 1995a). In a relatively
short time span, the longline fishery has grown to be the largest and most prominent
commercial fishery in Hawaii. The number of active longline vessels almost qua-
drupled, from 37 vessels in 1987 to a high of 141 vessels in 1991. This number then
leveled off at about 120 vessels from 1992 through 1994, declined slightly to 103
vessels in 1996, and increased to 125 vessels in 2000 (Ito and Machado 2001).
Longlining allows a single vessel to spread effort over a large area to harvest
fish that are not concentrated enough to be caught by other fishing methods.
Longline fishing gear consists of a monofilament main line strung horizontally
across 1-100 km of sea, supported by vertical float lines connected to surface floats
at regular intervals. Descending from the main line are branch lines, each ending in
a single, baited hook. The main line droops in a curve from one float line to the next
and bears from two to 25 branch lines between floats. One set of longline gear can
consist of thousands of hooks clipped to the main line extending across several
miles of ocean. Fishing depth depends on the length of the float lines and branch
lines, the sag in the main line, and the position of the branch lines. Fishing depth
affects the efficiency with which different species are captured. One longline set is
made per fishing day, and the deployment and retrieval of the lines may take up to
24 hours (Boggs and Ito 1993).
The National Marine Fishery Services (NMFS) Honolulu Laboratory classifies
longline fishing trips into one of the three trip categories: swordfish trip, tuna trip,
and mixed trip, based on interviews, fishing destination, input use, time of set, catch
composition, and species targeted (Curtis 1999).1 It was observed that some vessels
choose to specialize either in bigeye tuna or swordfish, while others harvest both
during a trip. Each trip strategy involves a different production technology, such as
timing of laying out sets, depth, and number of hooks and light sticks.2
Hawaii longliners often sell their fresh tuna at the auction to both local and ex-
port wholesalers. The auction price is determined by a combination of factors, such
as the buyers’ assessment of quality, market demand, and current supply of fish. The
swordfish catch, on the other hand, is typically sold directly to export wholesalers
who ship it by air to the US mainland, Japan, and Europe (WPFRMC 1995a, 1995b).
The most significant change in Hawaii’s longline fishery over recent years has
been the shift of effort from swordfish trips to tuna trips. For example, the number
of swordfish trips declined from 292 in 1991 to just 84 in 1998. On the other hand,
the number of tuna trips increased from 556 to 760 over the same period (Ito and
Machado 2001). Conflicts between longliners and the trollers and handliners, con-
cern  over  impacts on  endangered  species,  and  the  possibility  of  localized
1 The timing and configuration of a set used in the mixed trip is similar to that used in the swordfish trip
except that the mixed set uses fewer light sticks and slightly more hooks, enabling the mixed set to tar-
get both bigeye tuna and swordfish. The mixed trip does not involve altering a set or switching sets de-
signed to target bigeye tuna or swordfish during a trip. In 98% of trips during 1991–98, it was observed
that fishers select only one type of set; i.e., swordfish set, tuna set, or mixed set during a trip.
2 The length of the main line in a tuna set is about 20–25 miles compared to 35–45 miles in swordfish
and mixed sets. The tuna set is laid out in the morning and hauled in the evening, while swordfish and
mixed sets are laid out in the evening and hauled in the morning (Curtis 1999). It is evident from the
1991–98 logbook records that, on average, tuna sets use more hooks per set compared to swordfish and
mixed sets; i.e., 1,441 hooks/set in tuna sets vs. 815 and 876 hooks/set in swordfish and mixed sets, re-
spectively. Swordfish sets differ with mixed sets in terms of the number of light sticks; i.e., 485 light
sticks/set in swordfish sets vs. 225 light sticks/set in mixed sets.Pradhan, Sharma, and Leung 170
overfishing were the basis for developing regulations in 1990 (Pooley 1990; Boggs
and Ito 1993) and subsequent regulations under the Pelagic Fishery Management
Plan (WPRFMC 1994a and 1994b). Shark finning by longliners and other commer-
cial fleets and interactions with protective species (marine turtles and sea birds)
continue to be of important concern (WPRFMC 2001). A recent lawsuit charging
that the longline swordfishing is a threat to survival of turtle populations has led to
an injunction barring swordfish trips in certain waters off the Hawaiian Islands. This
has forced swordfish vessels either to leave Hawaii or to switch to tuna fishing.
About one-third of the longline vessels left to California after the ban on the sword-
fish harvest came into effect in summer 2000. The remaining vessels are now
involved in longline tuna fishing.
Conceptual Framework
The behavior of multispecies fishing firms is complicated and not quite established
in the literature. Each firm may have different strategies regarding what to fish,
where to fish, how much to fish, when to fish, and how to fish. Fishermen may have
different behavioral objectives, such as revenue maximization, profit maximization,
cost minimization, or maximization of expected utility. Given their objective, ex-
pected prices, and perceived stock abundance, fishers choose the gear, effort (input
mix), and fishing location, which ultimately determines species composition. This
may involve a multistage optimization process (Kirkley and Strand 1988). The ves-
sel size determines the trip length, trip distance, and crew size (Squires 1987a).
Changes in species composition may occur due to changes in several factors, includ-
ing output and factor prices, stock abundance, and seasonality (Squires 1987b). Due
to the distances involved between the port and fishing grounds and associated trip
costs (both in terms of time and fuel), it is rational for the fisher to keep his vessel at
sea until cumulative catch meets its storage capacity, provided that it has enough
fuel, food supplies, baits, and ice to avoid deterioration of fish quality. Fishers may
sometimes shorten their trips if the weather and market conditions warrant.
Cohorts of different fish species dwelling along a cross-sect of the ocean profile
are harvested by fishers using more or less similar technologies. In other words, sev-
eral species are targeted in similar waters using similar gears (Thunberg, Bresnyan,
and Adams 1995). The regulation of a single species may result in a negative exter-
nality on other species. The degree of such externality may vary considerably with
stock abundance, type of gear used, skill of fishermen, timing of fishing, depth
fished, and species targeted (Larson, House, and Terry 1996). The single-species
bioeconomic models have traditionally formed the basis for regulating multispecies
fisheries (Squires 1987b). Under this approach, regulatory authorities often assume
independent production functions among individual species landed (Kirkley and
Strand 1988).
One example of single-species regulation is to set quotas on outputs of indi-
vidual species. Quotas are often used to regulate the harvest of individual species in
multispecies fisheries. It has been widely observed that the quotas on individual spe-
cies can lead to excess discard of regulated species, technically inefficient
production, and unnecessary fish mortality of unintended species (Squires and
Kirkley 1991). With individual transferable quotas, fishers may attempt to reorga-
nize the optimum mix and volume of unregulated species. In the long-run, it may
also induce changes in the quantities of quasi-fixed factors. Because of an imperfect
understanding of the multiproduct production at the firm level and limited empirical
information on the firm’s product transformation and substitution possibilities, theAnalyzing Technical and Economic Interrelationships 171
traditional single-species based regulations of multispecies fisheries have usually
failed (Squires and Kirkley 1991).
The duality theory of production offers an attractive alternative to the traditional
bioeconomic approach in analyzing economic and technical structure in multispecies
fisheries. Duality is defined as the existence, under appropriate regularity conditions
of “dual functions” that embody the same information about the production tech-
nologies as contained in the more familiar primal functions (Diop and Kazmierczak
1996). Theoretically, when there is a single composite input and marginal cost of ad-
ditional input is zero, revenue maximization is equivalent to profit maximization
(McFadden 1966, 1978; Shephard 1970; Diewert 1974). A dual revenue function can
be used to determine the technical and economic interrelationships among species in
a multispecies fishery. Once target species and destination for a trip have been set,
all inputs required to make that trip become fixed (i.e., costs are sunk). Under these
conditions, the input mix for a given trip may be viewed as a single composite input.
On a trip basis, there exist limited opportunities to alter the input mix. When fishing
firms are price takers in output markets, a fisher will attempt to optimize species
mix on each trip to maximize revenue (Kirkley and Strand 1988).
The dual revenue framework does not focus on steady-state levels of the vari-
ables. Rather it offers the more immediate and detailed knowledge of the individual
firm’s production technology when considering a fishery regulation (Squires 1987b).
This approach defines the fishing firm’s short-run decision-making behavior in
terms of revenue maximization subject to a single composite input. Revenue maxi-
mization subject to a single fixed input appears to be a reasonable assumption to
make for a fishing firm making short-run output decisions (Kirkley and Strand 1988;
Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams 1995). The duality theory can be applied to exam-
ine the technical and economic relationships underlying multiproduct firms,
including multispecies fishing firms (Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams 1995).
Squires (1987a,c) was among the first to apply this approach to fisheries. The theory
has widely been applied to agricultural commodities to estimate supply response to
changes in prices (Shumway 1983; Taylor and Shonkwiler 1985). Its use in estimat-
ing technical and economic relationships and supply responses in the multispecies
fishery is a recent one (Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams 1995). The essence of this
approach is that the assumptions of nonjointness-in-inputs and separability between
outputs and inputs can be parametrically tested (Kirkley and Strand 1988).
The general revenue function is specified as:
R(P,Z) = max P × Q:Q Î Q(Z), P > 0 { }, (1)
where R(P,Z) is a revenue function, P is a vector of strictly positive output prices,
and Z is a composite of input or an effort variable. If R(P,Z) is differentiable in P, a






Equation (2) forms the basis for estimating own- and cross-price elasticities of
output supplies, as well as for testing the assumptions of nonjointness-in-inputs and
input-output separability. These assumptions have important implications for
multispecies fishery management.
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tion between any one output and any one input (Kirkley and Strand 1988; Squires
1987b). Fishers’ decisions on choice of target species are based on their expected
relative prices and prior knowledge subject to the technical constraints imposed by
resource availability and environmental conditions. Changes in relative species
prices do not have an effect on the optimal combinations of capital, labor, and fuel
(Squires 1987b). If the technology is separable between outputs and the fixed input,
the dual revenue function is separable in output prices and the composite input.
Mathematically this implies R(Z,P) = R(P)Z. This requires the marginal rate of
transformation for all output pairs be independent of all factor intensities (Hall
1973). The technology can then be specified up to a single composite output and
single composite input. In such a case, only the aggregate levels of catch and effort
require regulation, and regulation of species (input) mix does not adversely affect
the optimal factor (product) combinations (Squires and Kirkley 1991). It also im-
plies that total biomass management is possible (e.g., the management of overall
fish stock rather than individual species). Input-output separability is often assumed
in formulating policies involving effort restrictions in multispecies fisheries
(Kirkley and Strand 1988).
Jointness-in-inputs implies that all inputs are required to produce all outputs,
while nonjointness-in-inputs implies a separate production function for each output
or set of outputs. It implies that decisions about production of one commodity are
independent of decisions about the production of other commodities (Squires 1987b;
Kirkley and Strand 1988). Therefore, each production process can be separately
regulated without affecting production of the other processes because there are no
technological or cost tradeoffs between the output of one process and that of another
(Squires and Kirkley 1991). Nonjointness-in-inputs over all species implies that the
revenue function may be written as R(Z, P) = SiRi(Z, Pi). This further implies that
producers maximize harvests, and the supply of each species is perfectly inelastic.
Nonjointness-in-inputs has been widely assumed in traditional bioeconomic models
of multispecies fisheries management (Kirkley and Strand 1988).
The own-price supply elasticities are expected to be positive. The assumption of
revenue maximization implies that fishers will take advantage of changes in relative
prices by targeting species that will yield relatively higher revenue. Cross-price
elasticities can be positive or negative. A positive cross-price elasticity indicates a
complementarity in production either as targeted species or as bycatch; i.e., an in-
crease in price of one species will increase production of other species. The negative
cross-price elasticity suggests that the two species are substitutes in production and
that effort is allocated among species on the basis of differences in relative prices;
i.e., an increase in price of one species will decrease the production of other species.
The revenue function in equation (1) also forms the basis to examine various as-
pects of multiproduct cost structure, including the firm’s shadow cost economies of
scope and economies of scale. The firm’s total shadow cost is computed as:
C* = W*·Z, where W* = ¶R(P, Z)/¶Z, the shadow price or marginal revenue of effort
(Z). Scope economies provide information on cost savings from product diversifica-
tion when production is joint-in-inputs. An important source of scope economies is
cost complementarity or cost anti-complementarity. A cost complementarity (anti-
complementarity) exists between product i and product j if increased production of
Qj lowers (raises) the marginal cost of Qi. Measures of cost complementarities are
derived from the relationship between the two matrices as (Sakai 1974):
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where C[W,Q(P,Z)] is the equilibrium cost function, which forms the basis for com-
puting multiproduct economies of scope, economies of scale, and cost elasticities.
Previous Studies
The dual revenue function has mostly been applied to fisheries in the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans involving both bottomfish and pelagic species. The model specifica-
tion varies depending on the purpose of analysis. Leontief, translog, and quadratic
functional forms are commonly used.
Applying a dual revenue function model of the generalized Leontief’s form to
the New England multispecies trawl fishery, Kirkley and Strand (1988) showed that
the more commonly advocated forms of stock management, such as unit stock and
biomass, are inappropriate given that managers are concerned with the exploitation
of other species. Both hypotheses of nonjointness-in-inputs and input-output separa-
bility were rejected. Own-price elasticities of targeted species (cod and yellowtail
flounder) were estimated to be positive and significant, while those for incidental or
bycatch species (pollock and other flounders) were not significant. The results re-
vealed that restrictions on yellowtail flounder would increase the exploitation of
cod, pollock, and haddock.
Using a similar approach, Diop and Kazmierczak (1996) analyzed economic and
technical interactions among various species caught by the Mauritanian cephalopod
fishery. Both hypotheses of nonjointness-in-inputs and input-output separability
were rejected, suggesting that single-species management would result in negative
externalities on other species and management of the fishery as an aggregate stock
would be inappropriate. Own-price elasticities were positive for all species (octo-
pus, cuttlefish, and squid) except cephalopods. The authors further concluded that
the dominance of substitute relationships in the fishery would preclude the use of
‘key species’ management.
The dual revenue function approach was also used by Thunberg, Bresnyan, and
Adams (1995) in analyzing the technical and economic relationships in Florida’s
near-shore commercial fishery. They estimated the translog revenue function. Own-
price elasticities were positive and mostly significant. Cross-price elasticities were
also all positive and mostly significant, indicating the complementary relations in
production. These findings are consistent with the non-selective nature of the gillnet
fishery. The complementary relationship was estimated to be strongest for mullet,
which was the dominant species. The authors concluded that effective management
of the fishery is possible through measures designed to regulate the harvest of mul-
let.
Squires and Kirkley (1991) estimated cost functions derived from the general-
ized Leontief revenue function to examine the fishers’ short-run response to output
quotas in California’s fishery. They concluded that aggregate fishery quotas may be
inappropriate for managing sablefish, as this may result in excessive discard of
regulated species. They suggested alternative regulatory mechanisms, including li-
cense limitation, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and trip quotas. Similarly,
Squires (1987b) estimated long-run profit functions obtained from the translog rev-
enue function to determine the technical and economic structure in the New England
fishery. Own-price elasticities were inelastic for some species (yellowtail and other
flounders) and elastic for others (cod and haddock). All cross-price elasticities were
positive, indicating complementarity in production.Pradhan, Sharma, and Leung 174
Empirical Procedures
Empirical Model
It is assumed that fishers pursue long-run profit maximization in two stages. The
first stage involves selecting optimal vessel size, gear, design, and equipment. The
second stage involves revenue maximization over a time horizon in which vessel
size and characteristics are fixed (Campbell and Nicholl 1994). The empirical model
specified below attempts to describe the behavior of fishers in the second stage.
The revenue function for the analysis of multispecies fisheries can be empiri-
cally specified either in a generalized Leontief flexible functional form as in Kirkley
and Strand (1988), Campbell and Nicholl (1994), or in a translog form as in
Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams (1995). In this study, the non-homothetic general-
ized Leontief revenue function is used. The choice of the generalized Leontief form
hinges on the fact that it: (i) allows estimation in terms of output levels rather than
revenue shares as in the translog; (ii) is linear in parameters; (iii) can deal with the
non-homothetic technology; (iv) is one of the most useful forms in testing hypoth-
eses regarding the structure of input use and output (Lopez 1985), and (v) does not
lead to extreme variations in estimated elasticities as observed with translog func-
tion (Dixon, Garcia, and Anderson 1987). Analyzing the data in the level form can
be more useful for fishery managers, as it provides the type of information they are
familiar with (Kirkley and Strand 1988; Diop and Kazmierczak 1996; Bose,
Campbell, and McIlgorm 2000). Fisheries management and regulation often require
information on output levels and their responses to price changes for individual spe-
cies. The supply elasticities obtained from the estimated output supply equations can
be used to calculate changes in output supplies due to changes in output prices. A










where i and j denote fish species, Ps are output prices, Z is composite effort, Xs are
stock abundance indices for individual fish species, and bs and ds are parameters to
be estimated. The species aggregation, prices, composite effort, and stock indices
will be described subsequently. Note that a more general specification may also in-
clude various other factors (season, location, port, etc.) and their interaction terms
with  Ps and Z. The specification given in equation (4) imposes only a few restric-
tions on the underlying technology. It implies linear homogeneity in output prices,
jointness-in-inputs for the controllable factors of production, and nonjointness-in-in-
puts for the uncontrollable resource stock. Thus, the Leontief form is fairly flexible
to examine the underlying economic interactions in Hawaii’s longline fishery.
A system of input-compensated, revenue-maximizing output supply equations
Q i
*(P,Z) is obtained by Hotelling’s Lemma; i.e., differentiating the revenue func-
tion (equation 4) with respect to prices as:
¶R(P,Z)
¶P i
= Qi = bij
j¹i
å (Pj Pi)1/2 Z + biiZ + biZ 2 + diXiZ. (5)
The presence of output cross-price interaction terms in equation (5) allows the
possibility of jointness-in-inputs. Overall, nonjointness-in-inputs can be examined
by testing the restriction that bij = 0 " i ¹ j. Nonjointness-in-inputs for the kth species
can be determined by testing the restriction that bkj = 0 " k ¹ j. Separability betweenAnalyzing Technical and Economic Interrelationships 175
inputs and outputs can be ascertained by testing the restriction that bi = 0. Finally,
the symmetry condition can be tested using the restriction that bij = bji  for i ¹ j.
The fishers’ ability to change species mix of harvest for a given level of fishing
effort in response to price changes can be analyzed in terms of own-price and cross-
price output supply elasticities. The estimated supply equations [equation (5)] form
the basis for computing own-price supply elasticities for each species and cross-
price elasticities among the pairs of species. Accordingly, own-price elasticity of the
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Similarly, the cross-price elasticity of the ith species with respect to the jth spe-
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Effort elasticity (i.e., supply response to a change in the amount of composite



















A supply response to a change in stock conditions can be examined by comput-
ing elasticity with respect to the stock variable for each species as:
hix = (¶Qi ¶Xi) × (Xi Qi). (9)
The estimated revenue function [equation (4)] also forms the basis for deriving
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The firm may also adjust its level of composite effort in response to changes in
output prices. The shadow price of effort depends on output prices and the level of
quasi-fixed input, Z. This response can be assessed by deriving elasticity of effort
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The demand for effort in the equation (11) is derived by rearranging equation (10)Pradhan, Sharma, and Leung 176
as: Z = Z(P, W*), which, in turn, forms the basis to compute the elasticity of effort
with respect to price of each product. The relation given in equation (3) is used to exam-
ine economies of scope in terms of cost complementarity or anti-complementarity
between a pair of outputs. Following Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1988), the relative
degree of economies of scope, multiproduct economies of scale, product product-
specific economies of scale, and shadow cost elasticity are also examined.3
Species Aggregation
Hawaii’s pelagic fisheries harvest numerous targeted as well as incidental species.
For example, longline catch includes more than 20 different species. Therefore, for
revenue function analyses, these species were aggregated to a smaller, manageable num-
ber of species or species groups. This was done based on catch and revenue shares,
prices, and biological characteristics of fish species. Accordingly, longline species were
aggregated to six species or species groups. These included yellowfin tuna, albacore
tuna, bigeye tuna, broadbill swordfish, marlin, and other pelagic species. Marlin was an
aggregate of black marlin, blue marlin, and striped marlin. Similarly, the other pelagic
group included aku, barracuda, bluefin tuna, mahimahi, monchong, ono, opah,
papio, sailfish, short nose, walu, and other unclassified pelagic species.
Bigeye tuna and swordfish are the two major species targeted by the longline
fishers. Other species, such as yellowfin tuna, albacore tuna, marlins, and various
other pelagic species are also commercially important. In swordfish trips, swordfish
was the dominant species, accounting for 76% of total catch and 81% of total rev-
enue during 1991–98. In mixed trips, swordfish was dominant, followed by bigeye
tuna and yellowfin tuna, contributing to 48%, 21%, and 12% of total catch and 56%,
27%, and 13% of total revenue, respectively. In tuna trips, bigeye tuna was domi-
nant, representing about 38% of total catch and 59% of total revenue. Yellowfin
tuna, other pelagics, and albacore tuna contributed 10%, 16%, and 20% of total
catch and 12%, 9%, and 8% of total revenue, respectively.
Comparing over time, the total catch of swordfish for the longline fishery has
declined, while that of bigeye tuna increased due to effort reallocation from sword-
fish trips to tuna trips. For example, the contribution of swordfish to total longline
revenue decreased from 52% in 1991 to 23% in 1998, while that of bigeye tuna in-
creased from 28% to 49%. However, the catch composition has remained more or
less the same for a given trip type over the study period.
The number of species categories included in the analysis is quite limited rela-
tive to the number of species landed. Only observations with complete information
on outputs and prices of all species considered in the model could be used for esti-
mation.4 Observations with incomplete information were excluded. Hence, the larger
3 Mathematical details involved in calculating various aspects of multiproduct cost structure can be
found in Squires and Kirkley (1991) and, hence, are not presented here.
4 There were 6,666 trip records matched from different data sources; i.e., the National Marine Fisheries
Services (NMFS) logbook records and the Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources (HDAR). The analysis
included only 19% of 6,666 matched observations. In view of the exclusion of such a large number of
observations, one may suspect that the efficient vessels that could minimize bycatch by selectively targeting
only a limited number (1 to 3) of intended species may have been left out of the analysis. The analysis, how-
ever, included 116 or 70% of total vessels operating during 1991–98. Furthermore, the number of trips that
composed three or fewer species was only about 8% of the 6,666 matched trips. The remainder of the trips
had four or more species. Thus, the data demonstrates that the longline fishery is multispecies in nature
as opposed to harvesting only one or two select species. In terms of proportions of vessels covered and
similarities between the matched dataset and its subset that contains only complete information on
prices and catches of all the species under consideration for the analysis, we feel that the dataset with
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the number of species used in the model, the larger would be the number of observa-
tions unavailable for estimation. At the same time, aggregation would also result in
loss of information on individual species. Therefore, one has to keep this tradeoff in
mind in selecting the number of species in the analysis and interpreting the results.
As in Kirkley and Strand (1988), all estimates and derivations thereof are based on
the observations with complete information about prices and catch of all species
considered for the analysis.
Output Prices (Pi)
Output prices were computed implicitly using quantities sold and revenue received
for each species.5 In this study, we assumed that the fisher’s decision to harvest a
given quantity of a particular fish species is influenced by its expected price rather
than the current price. Accordingly, current trip-level outputs were expressed as
functions of prices obtained in the immediate preceding trip specific to the fisher.6
Effort Variable (Z)
Various vessel-specific (length, horsepower, gross registered tonnage, and net ton-
nage) and trip-level inputs (trip length, number of hooks, and number of sets) were
considered in deriving a measure of composite input/effort. Based on the correlation
coefficients of these variables, trip length and vessel net tonnage were selected in
order to compute the composite effort.7 A single composite effort or input (Z) was
derived as the product of trip length (in days) and vessel net tonnage. This approach
is similar to that used by Diop and Kazmierczak (1996) and Kirkley and Strand
(1988), where the composite effort was computed as the product of trip length and
vessel power. Campbell and Nicholl (1994) used the product of gross tonnage and
the number of sets as composite effort.
Stock Variable (X)
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) by species is the only available information on stock
abundance of each species under consideration in our study. The measure is used as a
proxy to assess the stock level of fish population (Campbell and Nicholl 1994 ). Clark
(1976) also succinctly points out that the ratio of catch divided by effort is almost al-
ways taken as at least a rough indication of the current stock level of the fish population.
Therefore, three CPUE measures were considered in the present study as a basis for cre-
ating stock indices variables. These included the number of fish landed per 1,000 hooks,
total pounds landed per 1,000 hooks, and total pounds landed per fishing day for each
5 Prices of marlins and other pelagic species were computed as weighted averages of three marlin spe-
cies and all other pelagic species, with weights being the shares of individual species in total catch of
marlins and other pelagic species, respectively.
6 This operation resulted in further loss of sizable number of observations; i.e., 971 out of 2,242 obser-
vations could not be used simply because of lack of price information in preceding trips.
7 The correlation coefficients among vessel power, vessel length, and vessel tonnage (both net and
gross) ranged from 0.77 to 0.83. The correlation between vessel net tonnage and trip length was 0.40;
0.53 between the number of hooks and trip length; and 0.88 between the number of sets and trip length.
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species or species group.8 These measures were found to be highly correlated. The
number of fish per 1,000 hooks by species was used as a basis for the measure of
stock abundance, as this measure is also adopted in other WPRFMC publications.
The stock variable (X) was expressed in terms of an index. This study used the
species-specific stock index as a measure of stock abundance.9 Species-specific
stock indices were constructed for each quarter from individual fisher’s trip level
CPUE for each species. The entire set of trip observations in the matched dataset
was used for this purpose. Then, trip-level CPUE was averaged quarterly over all
fishers and trip types for each species or group of species considered in this study.
The estimated species-specific quarterly CPUE was indexed by taking the CPUE
measure for the first quarter of 1992 as a reference point. Thus, the index is one for
the first quarter of 1992. The value greater (smaller) than one for any given quarter
of a year implies a better (worse) stock situation for that quarter relative to the first
quarter of 1992. The quarterly stock indices were created in a way that all fishers,
regardless of the type of trip they choose, face the same stock or population level for
a given quarter of a year for the given species. Instead of seasonal or annual dum-
mies, quarterly stock indices for individual species were mainly used because they
allow for the examination of supply responses to changes in stock situations for
each species. They capture seasonal and annual stock variation, as well as the migra-
tory pattern, recruitment, and other environmental aspects affecting CPUE.
Estimation
In view of differences in harvesting technologies and output composition among dif-
ferent trip types, revenue function analyses for the longline fishery were carried out
separately for swordfish, mixed, and tuna trips.10 This will provide information on
how different trip types respond to changes in prices, fishing effort, and resource
level. The data were examined for heteroskedasticity by applying the White test to
each output supply function in equation (5) and also by plotting the residuals against
the composite input by trip type. No significant heteroskedasticity was found at the
0.05 level. The systems of output supply functions were then estimated using
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) technique.11
Data
The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Honolulu Laboratory longline
logbook and the State of Hawaii’s Division of Aquatic Resources (HDAR) commer-
cial catch records are the key sources of data involved in the study. The NMFS
8 Dupont (1990) used total catch weighted by trip length to create an index of stock abundance. We in-
stead used the number of fish per 1,000 hooks to create a species-specific abundance index. Further, the
number of fish rather than weight is believed to be a better proxy of fish population.
9 However, monthly total catch (of all species under consideration) per unit of effort was used as a mea-
sure of stock abundance in Campbell and Nicholl (1994).
10 Other studies have carried out separate analyses by vessel size; e.g., in Kirkley and Strand (1988).
11 The estimated system, in general, can be specified as g = Kb + e, where g is a (Nx1) vector of obser-
vations on catch, K is a (NxM) matrix of jointly exogenous variables in the system, b is a (Mx1) vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated, and e is a (Nx1) vector of disturbances. When it is believed that error
terms are contemporaneously correlated across equations, the SURE method is recommended. This method
uses the estimates of the covariance of residuals across equations in an attempt to improve the efficiency of
parameter estimates. The residuals obtained using the joint-generalized least squares procedure are used
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logbook data provide information on fishing effort (such as trip length, number of
sets, number of hooks, number of light sticks, etc.), trip type, fishing location, and
number of fish caught by species. The HDAR data provide information on total
pounds of fish caught and sold, number of fish caught, and revenue by species. Be-
sides  these  data,  additional  vessel-specific  information  (such  as  tonnage,
horsepower, size, etc.) was obtained from the data maintained by the U.S. Coast
Guard.
The HDAR data are maintained at the trip level, while NMFS logbook data are
at the set level. Therefore, the initial task involved the transformation of the logbook
data from set level to trip level. Then, the data from the two sources were merged
using some key identifying variables, such as vessel permit number/name, hauling
and reporting dates, species, and the number of fish reported. For the period from
1991 to 1998, the trip-level longline observations in the NMFS logbook and HDAR
datasets totaled 10,597 and 8,618, respectively, of which 6,666 were matched. The
matched dataset represented about 77% of the total catch.12 The dataset used in the
estimation represented 70% or 116 of the 167 total vessels operating during the
study period.13 The data after the ban on swordfish harvest are not included because
of data unavailability at the time of this analysis.
Results and Discussion
Summary statistics of the variables involved in estimating the dual revenue function
models are presented in table 1 and those for all matched observations are presented
in table 2. Comparing the two tables, the dataset used in the analysis (i.e., those with
complete information) and the matched dataset appeared to be fairly similar in terms
of means and standard deviations of prices of individual species, catch levels, and
effort variables. Comparing the values of the variables across trips, swordfish and
bigeye tuna were caught in large amounts in the swordfish and tuna trips, respec-
tively. In mixed trips, the amount of swordfish caught is higher than bigeye tuna.
Bycatch (other pelagic species) was higher in the tuna trips compared to other trips.
Mean prices of individual species are more or less similar across trips, but prices
varied less for the primary target species in both the swordfish and tuna trips. Rela-
tively larger vessels appeared to be taking more swordfish trips and mixed trips than
tuna trips, and trip length was longer with swordfish trips than other trips.
Tests of Regularity Conditions
A dual-based revenue function should satisfy the following regularity conditions: (i)
symmetry, (ii) monotonicity, (iii) convexity, (iv) concavity, and (v) homogeneity. All
were examined in this study. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests of the symmetry con-
dition suggested that the restricted estimates are the same as the unrestricted
12 The mean statistics between the matched and unmatched data were similar. For example, on a per-trip
basis the average number of hooks used, number of sets used, average number of fish caught, revenue,
and total catch landed were (11,168 vs. 10,689), (9.82 vs. 9.11), (217 vs. 199), ($37,624 vs. $32,478),
and (14,666 lbs. vs. 13,256) for the matched vs. unmatched datasets, respectively.
13 A further comparison of the matched dataset with its subset data used in the analysis is given in tables
1 and 2. On average, quantities, proportions and prices by species, and fishing effort were fairly similar
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estimates in all trip types.14 The homogeniety condition was not tested as the gener-
alized  Leontief  function implies  linear  homogeneity. The  models satisfied
monotonicity globally. The supply equations also satisfied the concavity condition,
except for the albacore supply equation in mixed trips and the marlin equation in
tuna trips. Convexity was tested and the substitution matrix was found to be positive
semi-definite for all trip types.15 Thus, the revenue function and its supply corre-
spondences satisfied the regularity conditions.
14 The LR test values for swordfish trips, mixed trips, and tuna trips were 0.044, 0.0089, and 0.075, re-
spectively. The c2(15) value of 24.99 at the 0.05 level suggests that the restricted estimates are the same
as unrestricted estimates.
15 The supply substitution matrices were found to be symmetric, and the determinants of these matrices
for swordfish trips, mixed trips, and tuna trips were computed to be 0.0000563, 0.0000017, and
0.0000367, respectively.
Table 1
Mean Statistics of the Variables used in Estimating Longline Trip-level
Output Supply Functions, 1991–98
Swordfish Trips Mixed Trips Tuna Trips
(n = 240) (n = 669) (n = 362)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Outputs (lbs./trip)
Yellowfin tuna 1,195 1,268 1,704 2,200 1,632 1,923
Albacore tuna 822 1,229 566 808 2,919 3,992
Bigeye tuna 1,874 1,751 2,879 2,870 4,502 3,865
Swordfish 15,781 8,434 7,123 8,200 826 2,573
Marlin 1,089 1,319 1,351 1,574 2,025 1,588
Other pelagics 637 838 663 908 2,234 1,634
Expected prices (US$/lb.)
Yellowfin tuna 2.97 1.17 3.10 1.22 2.88 1.06
Albacore tuna 0.98 0.60 1.26 0.62 1.41 0.56
Bigeye tuna 3.94 2.04 3.91 2.12 3.41 1.28
Swordfish 3.12 0.91 2.97 1.05 2.79 1.32
Marlin 1.47 0.77 1.41 0.75 1.28 0.56
Other pelagics 2.37 3.40 1.83 1.89 1.50 1.11
Effort
Net tonnage 72.82 30.05 67.13 24.19 61.41 24.21
Trip length (days) 17.82 7.51 11.51 5.05 12.18 3.72
Stock index (1st Quarter of 1992 =1)
Yellowfin tuna 1.47 0.73 1.56 0.80 1.59 0.81
Albacore tuna 1.69 1.36 1.73 1.13 2.19 1.28
Bigeye tuna 0.96 0.37 1.00 0.38 1.06 0.45
Swordfish 0.83 0.28 0.74 0.29 0.57 0.27
Marlin 0.96 0.22 0.98 0.23 0.95 0.29
Other pelagics 2.34 1.37 2.46 1.53 2.43 1.39
Note: n denotes the number of observations with complete information involving current trip-level out-
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Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates from the systems of supply equations are presented in table
3. The system weighted R2 values were 0.110, 0.152, and 0.151 for swordfish,
mixed, and tuna trips, respectively.16
Own-price coefficients are not directly estimated because output supplies are a
function of prices normalized by own-prices. Most of the supply equations had a
number of statistically significant coefficients. Altogether, about 40% of the coeffi-
cients were statistically significant. The coefficients associated with prices are best
16 The R2 values for individual OLS equations for each species are given in parentheses below. Sword-
fish trips: yellowfin (0.07), albacore (0.16), bigeye tuna (0.14), swordfish (0.21), marlin (0.06), and
other pelagics (0.13) Mixed trips: yellowfin (0.15), albacore (0.05), bigeye tuna (0.10), swordfish
(0.30), marlin (0.10), and other pelagics (0.25) Tuna trips: yellowfin (0.15), albacore (0.20), bigeye tuna
(0.29), swordfish (0.18), marlin (0.16), and other pelagics (0.17).
Table 2
Mean Statistics of the Variables from all Matched Observations, 1991–98
Swordfish Trips Mixed Trips Tuna Trips
(n = 1,225) (n = 2,205) (n = 3,236)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Outputs (lbs./trip)
Yellowfin tuna 986 1,152 1,570 2,042 1,460 1,888
Albacore tuna 948 1,733 620 1,136 2,816 4,020
Bigeye tuna 1,917 1,955 2,810 2,856 5,515 4,470
Swordfish 16,429 11,564 6,422 7,831 703 2,732
Marlin 738 1,096 1,202 1,416 1,712 1,499
Other pelagics 571 905 849 1,255 2,319 1,843
Expected prices (US$/lb.)
Yellowfin tuna 2.99 1.30 3.10 1.37 2.87 1.12
Albacore tuna 1.07 0.71 1.27 0.61 1.48 0.61
Bigeye tuna 4.16 2.51 3.93 2.25 3.43 1.29
Swordfish 3.15 0.92 2.96 0.98 2.66 1.40
Marlin 1.51 0.92 1.32 0.75 1.34 0.60
Other pelagics 1.98 3.13 1.71 2.18 1.33 0.76
Effort
Net tonnage 76.58 29.98 65.48 24.27 52.07 25.16
Trip length (days) 17.52 8.41 10.55 6.07 11.19 4.14
Stock index (1st Quarter of 1992 =1)
Yellowfin tuna 1.47 0.65 1.54 0.78 1.54 0.76
Albacore tuna 1.33 1.08 1.50 1.16 1.97 1.30
Bigeye tuna 0.93 0.41 0.99 0.39 1.15 0.45
Swordfish 0.85 0.27 0.77 0.28 0.62 0.28
Marlin 1.04 0.31 1.07 0.32 0.96 0.33
Other pelagics 2.37 1.54 2.36 1.42 2.40 1.54
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explained in terms of cross- and own-price elasticities.17 Of particular interest in the
estimated supply equations were the effort, squared-effort, and stock coefficients.
The majority of the effort coefficients were positive, and the negative effort coeffi-
cients were mostly insignificant at the 0.05 level, except for marlin in tuna trips.
The coefficients for the squared effort terms were mostly negative (in 77% of cases)
and several of them were statistically significant, indicating that effort is character-
ized by diminishing marginal productivity. Because of interaction of effort with
stock indices, the effect of effort on output supplies is better explained in terms of
effort elasticities rather than their coefficients in supply equations. The stock coeffi-
cients were all positive and mostly significant at the 0.01 level, indicating a positive
effect of stock level on output supplies of all species categories.
17 The parameter estimates from a Leontief function do not have much economic meaning on their own.
They simply are useful in determining elasticity values.
Table 3
Parameter Estimates for Longline Trip-level Output Supply Functions
Yellowfin Albacore Bigeye Swordfish Marlin Others Effort Effort2 Stock
Swordfish Trips
Yellowfin tuna 0.1146 –0.2073 –0.2073 0.3017** 0.1147* –0.5283 0.0001 0.1866***
(0.1007) (0.1442) (0.1343) (0.1333) (0.0619) (0.3596) (0.0001) (0.0724)
Albacore tuna –0.0617 0.1603* –0.0009 0.1015** –0.1941 –0.0001 0.2083***
(0.0901) (0.0899) (0.1208) (0.0469) (0.3515) (0.0001) (0.0478)
Bigeye tuna –0.0447 –0.2323* –0.1189* 1.0927** –0.0003*** 0.6589***
(0.1908) (0.1303) (0.0658) (0.4797) (0.0001) (0.1531)
Swordfish SYMMETRIC 0.0082 –0.0310 0.6738 –0.0001 3.1280***
(0.1201) (0.0671) (2.3860) (0.0005) (1.0877)
Marlin –0.0203 –0.2464 0.0001 0.1677
(0.0632) (0.4617) (0.0001) (0.2367)
Others –0.0609 –0.0001 0.1084***
(0.2061) (0.0001) (0.0197)
Mixed Trips
Yellowfin tuna 0.1382* –0.1410 –0.2546 0.1579 0.0027 –0.7196 –0.0002** 1.0245***
(0.0704) (0.2181) 0.2860) (0.1581) (0.0720) (0.5145) (0.0001) (0.1073)
Albacore tuna 0.1260***–0.2303***–0.0994 0.0192 0.0759 0.0000 0.0706***
(0.0475) (0.0665) (0.0922) (0.0516) (0.1831) (0.0001) (0.0282)
Bigeye tuna 0.2445 –0.4663*** –0.0502 1.0998 –0.0006*** 1.3425***
(0.3353) (0.1147) (0.0450) (0.6818) (0.0002) (0.2883)
Swordfish SYMMETRIC 0.7630*** 0.0287 –0.3194 –0.0010*** 11.0568***
(0.1571) (0.0756) (1.4289) (0.0004) (0.9645)
Marlin –0.0013 0.3691 –0.0002** 0.2097
(0.0777) (0.3706) (0.0001) (0.2344)
Others –0.1026 –0.0001 0.2539***
(0.1660) (0.0001) (0.0199)
Tuna Trips
Yellowfin tuna –0.3977 –0.6355 0.2968 0.1546 0.5153** –0.4941 –0.0001 0.9204***
(0.4799) (0.4085) (0.2940) (0.2590) (0.2291) (0.9101) (0.0004) (0.1376)
Albacore tuna –0.3347 0.2666 0.1854 0.1327 0.1582 –0.0011 1.2892***
(0.5645) (0.4053) (0.3404) (0.3101) (1.7721) (0.0008) (0.1596)
Bigeye tuna –0.6670* –0.2183 –0.4450* 1.0652 –0.0014** 4.3535***
(0.3466) (0.2562) (0.2688) (1.5644) (0.0007) (0.4222)
Swordfish SYMMETRIC 0.0044 0.3896 2.0581* –0.0010** 1.5730***
(0.1863) (0.1843) (1.0649) (0.0005) (0.5773)
Marlin –0.0541 –1.4741** 0.0003 1.9335***
(0.1984) (0.7206) (0.0003) (0.3028)
Others –0.0731 –0.0003 0.3278***
(0.6913) (0.0003) (0.0692)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
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Tests of Hypotheses
The results of tests of hypotheses for nonjointness-in-inputs and input-output sepa-
rability are presented in table 4. The hypothesis of nonjointness-in-inputs is rejected
for all outputs taken together as well as for most individual species for all trip types.
The rejection of the nonjointness-in-inputs hypothesis suggests that there are signifi-
cant technical interactions among species landed by longliners, implying that single
species regulation would affect the exploitation of unregulated species. The recent
ban on swordfishing in certain Hawaiian waters geared toward managing sea turtles
and other endangered species rather than managing swordfish per se may, however,
affect the exploitation of the other species since the longline fishery is characterized
by a joint production process.
Table 4
Tests of Hypotheses of Nonjointness-in-Inputs and Input-Output Separability
F-Value
Degrees of Decision
F-Value Freedom Pr>F (a = 0.05)
Swordfish Trips
Nonjointness-in-inputs (bij = 0 " i ¹ j)
Overall 2.13 15;1401 0.00 Reject null
Yellowfin tuna 2.24 5;1401 0.04 Reject null
Albacore tuna 3.45 5;1401 0.00 Reject null
Bigeye tuna 1.70 5;1401 0.13 Accept null
Swordfish 1.26 5;1401 0.27 Accept null
Marlin 1.37 5;1401 0.23 Accept null
Other pelagics 1.94 5;1401 0.08 Reject null
Input-output separability (bi = 0) 1.45 6;1401 0.19 Accept null
Mixed Trips
Nonjointness in inputs (bij = 0 " i ¹ j)
Overall 3.85 15;3975 0.00 Reject null
Yellowfin tuna 1.18 5;3975 0.31 Accept null
Albacore tuna 4.52 5;3975 0.00 Reject null
Bigeye tuna 4.18 5;3975 0.00 Reject null
Swordfish 7.53 5;3975 0.00 Reject null
Marlin 7.83 5;3975 0.00 Reject null
Other pelagics 0.39 5;3975 0.85 Accept null
Input-output separability (bi = 0) 1.24 6;3975 0.28 Accept null
Tuna Trips
Nonjointness in inputs (bij = 0 " i ¹ j)
Overall 1.63 15;2133 0.05 Reject null
Yellowfin tuna 2.16 5;2133 0.05 Reject null
Albacore tuna 0.32 5;2133 0.90 Accept null
Bigeye tuna 2.27 5;2133 0.04 Reject null
Swordfish 1.57 5;2133 0.16 Accept null
Marlin 0.22 5;2133 0.95 Accept null
Other pelagics 2.63 5;2133 0.02 Reject null
Input-output separability (bi = 0) 1.37 6;2133 0.22 Accept nullPradhan, Sharma, and Leung 184
The results showed insufficient evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis of
separability between inputs and outputs for all trip types at the 0.05 level, suggest-
ing that the management of the longline fishery as one single fishery may be
appropriate. In fact, this result is consistent with past management of the fishery
through area or seasonal closure or by using the “limited entry” permit system
where the objective was to manage the entire fishery rather than managing indi-
vidual species.
Elasticities
The estimated own-price, cross-price, effort, and stock elasticities of output sup-
plies, along with their standard errors by trip type are given in tables 5 through 7.
Elasticities and standard errors were calculated at the sample mean values. Although
theory suggests that own-price supply elasticities be positive, some of the own-price
elasticities were negative but statistically insignificant, except for albacore in
swordfish trips. Although insignificant at the 0.05 level, own-price elasticities for
major targeted species like swordfish in swordfish trips or bigeye tuna in tuna trips
were positive. All own-price elasticities were inelastic.18 The results are comparable
with many earlier studies where own-price elasticities are mostly inelastic and not
all are consistently positive and significant. Moreover, own-price elasticities for
some species are negative and statistically significant as in Squires (1987b) and
Bose, Campbell, and McIlgorm (2000). It shows fishers’ limited ability to control
the species mix given the stock uncertainty of pelagic species due to their highly mi-
gratory nature.
The estimates of cross-price output supply elasticities revealed both the substi-
tution and complementary production relationships among species landed by the
Hawaii’s longline fishery. The cross-price supply elasticities were all inelastic. As
shown in tables 5 through 7, only about 33% of the cross-price elasticities were sta-
tistically significant and the rest were insignificant, suggesting that fishers have
limited ability to adjust the species mix and amount of output in the short run in re-
sponse to exogenous price changes. Instead, product mix largely depends on
resource abundance (Segerson and Squires 1993).
In swordfish trips, a significant complementary relationship existed between
yellowfin and marlin, yellowfin and other pelagics, albacore and swordfish, and al-
bacore and other pelagics (table 5). A significant substitute relationship existed
between bigeye tuna vs.  marlin, and bigeye tuna vs. other pelagics. The decline in
outputs of marlin and other pelagics due to an increase in bigeye tuna price was
much larger than the decline in output of bigeye tuna due to a price increase of mar-
lin and other pelagic species.
In mixed trips, a number of statistically significant complementary relationships
existed between yellowfin tuna and albacore, bigeye tuna and albacore, and sword-
fish and marlin (table 6). Statistically significant substitute relationships were
observed between bigeye tuna vs. marlin and swordfish vs. albacore. The decline in
output of marlin due to an increase in the price of bigeye tuna would be much larger
than the decline in bigeye tuna output due to an increase in the price of marlin.
Similarly, the effect of a change in swordfish price on albacore output would be
much larger than the effect of albacore price on swordfish output.
In tuna trips, the “others” category showed a significant complementary rela-
18 These trip-level elasticities are smaller in absolute values than those over a longer period due to Le
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tionship with swordfish and yellowfin tuna (table 7). Bigeye tuna’s cross-price elas-
ticity with respect to swordfish was both negative and significant, indicating
substitution in production. Moreover, swordfish cross-price elasticity with respect to
bigeye tuna price was higher than the bigeye tuna cross-price elasticity with respect
to the swordfish price, indicating that an increase in the price of bigeye tuna would
reduce the output of swordfish more than the decrease of bigeye tuna output due to
an increase in swordfish price.
These results demonstrate fishers’ revenue maximization behavior by harvesting
high-priced, highly abundant species like bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin
against relatively low-priced species like albacore, marlin, and other pelagics. The
existence of these substitute relationships suggests that single-species management
of the longline fishery may have negative effects on unregulated species through un-
anticipated shifts in production. Lack of significant complementary relationships
across all species, especially across the important, high-valued species like bigeye
tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin, suggests some degree of selective harvesting on the
part of fishers and incomplete joint production.
Also presented in tables 5 through 7 are the estimates of output elasticities with
respect to the composite effort by trip type. The estimates of effort elasticities were
positive for all species except yellowfin tuna in swordfish trips, and most of them
were significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the results suggest that output supplies re-
spond positively to an increase in the level of composite effort. Effort elasticities
were all inelastic, except for swordfish in tuna trips. A significant substitute rela-
tionship between bigeye tuna with swordfish in tuna trips raises the possibility of
increased exploitation of bigeye tuna in light of recent swordfish harvest restriction.
Some swordfish discards may be anticipated, but such discards may be limited, as
the average number of swordfish caught per tuna trip during 1991–98 was only 2.69,
which is well within the allowable catch limit; i.e., a vessel can sell up to 10 sword-
fish/trip if caught during a tuna trip.
Estimates of stock elasticities for each species, indicating a supply response to
their seasonal stock fluctuations, are shown in the last column of tables 5 through 7.
Stock elasticities were all positive and mostly significant at the 0.01 level for most
species for all trip types. Most of the stock elasticities were inelastic, implying that
outputs responded by a lesser magnitude relative to the variation in their stock lev-
els.
Finally, elasticities of composite effort with respect to individual output prices
are presented in table 8. It was generally observed that an increase in fish prices re-
sulted in a positive effect on fishing effort. Except for yellowfin tuna in swordfish
trips, price elasticities of effort were all positive, suggesting that higher fish prices
would increase the level of effort devoted to longline fishing. Effort was output
price elastic for swordfish in swordfish and mixed trips. Effort was also modestly
responsive for bigeye tuna in all trip choices. In other cases, output prices had little
effect on effort devoted to the longline fishery.
Multiproduct Cost Structure
Economies of scope provide a measure of cost savings (or in the present context
revenue increases) through product diversification when production is joint-in-in-
puts. The shadow cost complementarities (or anti-complementarities) are an
important source of economies (or diseconomies) of scope. These measures were de-
rived using a relationship between multiproduct cost and revenue functions given in
equation (3). These results indicated the existence of cost complementarities in
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marginal cost of product j, for i ¹ j. Cost anti-complementarities were dominant in
mixed and tuna trips, where increased production of one species would increase the
marginal cost of others. Thus, these results revealed some interesting patterns. For
example, in swordfish trips where the primary target includes a single species (i.e.,
swordfish), cost complementarities were dominant. On the other hand, in the case of
multiple species targeting, as in mixed and tuna trips, cost anti-complementarities
were dominant. Shadow unit prices of composite effort (i.e., product of trip length
in days and vessel net tonnage), in terms of marginal revenue forgone, were $10.66,
$15.63, and $27.83 for swordfish, tuna, and mixed trips, respectively. Accordingly,
per-trip total shadow costs were estimated to be $14,776, $12,044, and $22,561, re-
spectively. Multiproduct economies of scale (i.e., the ratio between total shadow
cost and total revenue) for swordfish, tuna, and mixed trips were computed to be
0.23, 0.37, and 0.54, respectively, indicating decreasing returns to scale for all trip
types. Thus, firms do not realize cost or revenue advantages from harvesting more
fish in fixed proportions when prices and resource abundance are constant.
Except for yellowfin in swordfish trips, incremental costs (i.e., costs involved in
including a given species in production) were positive in all cases, implying that in-
cluding these species in longline harvest would increase costs. Total incremental
costs were highest for primary targets, such as swordfish in swordfish and mixed
trips and bigeye tuna in tuna trips. Similarly, average incremental costs were highest
for swordfish in tuna and mixed trips, followed by bigeye tuna in swordfish and
mixed trips.
The relative degree of shadow economies of scope indicated that in swordfish
trips joint production of each species would result in some cost increases (or rev-
enue  losses  in  the  revenue  function  context)  rather  than  producing  them
individually. However, producing different species jointly or individually would
have no notable effects on tuna and mixed trips, except for other species. The pro-
duction of other species individually would result in cost increases in mixed trips
but decreases in tuna trips. Except for albacore tuna in swordfish trips and swordfish
in tuna trips, product-specific economies of scale were all less than unity, indicating
decreasing returns to scale. Shadow cost elasticity was highest for primary targets,
such as swordfish in swordfish trips and bigeye tuna in tuna trips.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this study was to analyze technical and economic interrelation-
ships among species harvested by Hawaii’s longline fishery during 1991–98 by
estimating the dual supply functions derived from the generalized Leontief revenue
Table 8
Elasticities of Composite Effort with Respect to Output Prices
Species Swordfish Trips Mixed Trips Tuna Trips
Yellowfin tuna –0.067 0.122 0.146
Albacore tuna 0.007 0.020 0.104
Bigeye tuna 0.728 0.548 0.623
Swordfish 2.225 1.813 0.295
Marlin 0.028 0.057 0.073
Others 0.029 0.052 0.057Pradhan, Sharma, and Leung 190
function. The results revealed some significant substitution and complementary rela-
tionships, which should be taken into account when some species are considered for
regulation. The hypothesis of nonjointness-in-inputs was rejected for all trip types,
indicating that Hawaii’s longline fishery is characterized by a joint production pro-
cess. Thus, any effort restriction on one species may result in a production decline
of all species. From a fishery management perspective, the results indicated that the
regulation of a single species may affect the exploitation of other species. In other
words, traditional single-species regulation would be inappropriate in managing the
longline fishery. The hypothesis of input-output separability was not rejected for all
trip types. This suggests that the longline fishery can be managed as a whole rather
than focusing on individual species. This finding is consistent with Hawaii’s past
fishery management through area or partial seasonal closure and by the ‘limited en-
try’ permit system, where the primary focus has been the entire fishery rather than
individual species.
Although own-price elasticities were statistically insignificant, the longline
fishers appeared to be behaving rationally in their output supply decisions for all
types of trips, as evidenced by the symmetric and positive semidefiniteness of the
supply substitution matrices.19 Given stock uncertainty and the fishers’ limited abil-
ity to control species-mix, fishers seemed to be more inclined to maximize total
catch and revenue rather than being very selective on desired species. However, sub-
stantial economic and technical interactions were found to exist as evidenced by a
number of significant cross-price elasticities, indicating either complementary or
substitution relations in production among pairs of species. However, such interac-
tions varied by trip choices and fish species. The estimated cross-price elasticities
provide evidence of the need for fishery managers to account for underlying techni-
cal and economic interactions inherent in the longline fishery when a species
regulation is under consideration. The existence of substitute relationships in the
longline fishery also suggests that single-species management of the longline fishery
may have negative effects on unregulated species through unanticipated shifts in
production, therefore requiring the management of more than one species. The re-
cent regulation aimed at banning the harvest of swordfish by Hawaii’s longliners is
an example of single-species regulation. Because of jointness-in-production, regu-
lating swordfish catch would affect the harvest of other species in tuna trips.
Based on the nature of substitute relationships among some species, there was a
general tendency that declines in outputs of a relatively lower-valued species due to
an increase in prices of high-valued species were greater than the declines in the
outputs of a higher-valued species due to an increase in the prices of relatively low-
valued species. It also demonstrates fishers’ revenue maximization behavior by
harvesting high-priced species like bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna
against relatively low-priced species like albacore tuna, marlin, and other pelagics
whenever the higher-valued species are abundantly available. As expected, both ef-
fort and stock elasticities of output supplies were positive and significant, yet
inelastic in most cases. Similarly, the composite effort elasticities with respect to in-
dividual species prices were also positive, yet inelastic for all trip choices.
Besides testing hypotheses of nonjointness-in-inputs and input-output separabil-
ity and deriving the various output supply and effort elasticities, multiproduct
shadow cost structure (multiproduct economies of scope and scale, product-specific
economies of scope and scale, and cost elasticities) was also examined to improve
19 The symmetric and positive semidefiniteness of the output supply substitution matrix suggests that
output supply increases with an increase in its own prices, and if the price of an input increases, the
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the understanding of technical and economic interrelationships in Hawaii’s longline
fishery. The results showed decreasing returns to scale. Cost complementarities were
dominant in swordfish trips, while cost anti-complementarities were dominant in
mixed and tuna trips. Product-specific economies of scale also revealed decreasing
returns to scale for most species. Although the production was characterized to be
joint-in-inputs, based on degree of shadow economies of scope, overall joint produc-
tion did not reveal any cost advantages. Perhaps this may again be attributed to
fishermen’s limited ability to choose an optimal output-mix due to bycatch.
The technical and economic interrelationships inferred from this study may also
be useful in ecosystem-based fishery management. The fishery managers will be
able to assess how regulation of one species can affect other, unregulated species.
This information will be particularly useful in assessing the impacts of the recent
ban on targeting swordfish by longliners in an effort to minimize sea turtle interac-
tions with shallow-set swordfish longlining. The regulation also applies to swordfish
catches in tuna trips. A significant substitute relationship between bigeye tuna and
swordfish in tuna trips suggests some possibility of increased exploitation of bigeye
tuna when swordfish harvest is imposed. However, the exploitation of bigeye tuna
vis-à-vis swordfish discard due to swordfish harvest restriction may not be serious,
as a fisher is still allowed to market up to ten swordfish caught in a tuna trip. The
average number of swordfish caught per tuna trip in the past (during 1991-98) was
only 2.69, which is well within the allowed limit. However, the new regulation re-
quires all longline vessels to redirect their harvesting strategies to species other than
swordfish by setting hooks deeper. The consequent increase in tuna trips primarily
due to a shift of some vessels previously taking swordfish and mixed trips may re-
sult in increased exploitation of bigeye tuna along with other species that were
previously less exploited. Moreover, a large number of small-scale fisheries, like
trollers and handliners, that largely rely on tunas and other pelagic species may be
affected over time by extensive/intensive extraction of tunas and other pelagic spe-
cies by larger commercial longline vessels, the impact of which has yet to be
assessed. In the light of these concerns, it would be useful to extend this study to
analyze data after the swordfish harvest ban. Such a comparative study before and
after a regulation can be quite useful in evaluating the effects of existing regulations
as well as in considering future regulations.
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